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THE POWERS OF COURTS OF EQUITY.
III.
oiFAT
E~n~sO
QUITABLE DECREES.
To a considerable extent the legal effects' of equitable decrees
have already been discussed, but there remain to be considered
certain phases of the matter not directly connected with our
discussion of equitable procedure. It must first be noted that
it has often been denied that, in the absence of statutes, equitable
decrees have legal effects comparable to the effects of judgments
at law. In this connection one learned writer says:
"Indeed, it may be stated broadly that a decree in chancery
has not in itself (i. e., independently of what may be done under
it) any legal operation whatever. If a debt, whether by simple
contract or by specialty, be sued for in a court of law, and
judgment recovered, the original debt is merged in the judgment,
and extinguished by it, and the judgment creates a new debt of a
higher nature, and of which the judgment itself is conclusive
evidence. But if the same debt be sued for in the court of
chancery (as it frequently may be) and a decree obtained for
its payment, not one of the effects before stated is produced by
the decree. Undoubtedly it has often been said by chancellors
that their decrees are equal to judgments at law, but that only
means that they will, to the extent of their power, secure for
their decrees the same advantages that judgments have by law;
it does not mean that a decree is by law equal to a judgment.
Again, if a claim be made the subject of 'an action at law,
and judgment be rendered for the defendant upon the merits,
the judgment is conclusive evidence that the claim was not well
founded, and it will therefore furnish a perfect defence to any
future action upon the same claim; but a decree in equity against
the validity of a claim is never a defence to an action at law
upon the same claim. Here again, however, the chancellor will
make his decrees equal to judgments so far as it is in his power
to do so; and therefore a decree in chancery against a claim
upon its merits will always be a defence to any future suit in
chancery upon the same claim, not as destroying the claim or
as proving conclusively its invalidity, but as furnishing a sufficient reason why chancery should not again take cognizance of
it. Such a decree will also be (what is sometimes called) an
equitable defence to any action at law upon the same claim, i.e.,
the chancellor will enjoin the prosecution of any such action, upon
the ground that the plaintiff having elected to make his claim the
subject of a suit in equity, and that suit having been defended
'The phrase "legal effects" is here used as including the effects both
at common law and in equity. There is unfortunately no term in common

use which exactly covers both. We shall therefore have to speak of the
"legal effects at common law" and the "legal effects in equity."
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successfully upon the merits, it is not right that the defendant
should be vexed again by the same claim." 2
If these statements are correct, the doctrine of res judicata
has no application to the adjudications and decrees of courts of
equity. That the doctrine does apply to courts of equity is, however, asserted by other writers in the most unmistakable terms.
For example, one writer says:
"A decree in chancery, like a judgment at law, when rendered on the merits, is final and conclusive upon the parties, not
only as to facts or issues actually decided, but as to all points
necessarily involved in the matter adjudicated." 3
The same view is announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States in many cases, from one of which we may quote:
"We hold no doctrine to be better settled than this, that
whenever the parties to a suit and the subject in controversy
between them are within the regular jurisdiction of a court of
equity, the decree of that court solemnly and finally pronounced,
is to every intent as binding as would be the judgment of a
court of law, upon parties and their interests regularly within its
cognizance." 4
This divergence of view seems to be due to the fact that apparently the learned writer first quoted was confining his attention to the English court of equity as it existed down to the
time of Lord Eldon or a little later. Even at that time it seems
that it was not regarded as a court of record. The old notion
of the chancellor as the King's Secretary administering justice
for the King, apparently still persisted to that extent. But this
view seems not to have been accepted in America after we
started on our separate existence, and is certainly not true to-day,
for with us the court of chancery is as much a court of record
as a court of law.5 So soon as this latter view prevailed, the
application of the doctrine of res Judicata to chancery adjudications and decrees was to be expected.
In view of the statements of the writer first quoted, and of
the wide currency they have received both because of the eminence
of their author and because they are reprinted without annotation
in the introductory part of one of the most widely used case'Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading (2nd ed.) 35, note 4. It
seems that the learned writer means to include under the phrase "legal
operation" the legal effects both at law and in equity.
'2 Black, Judgments (2nd ed.) § 517. The same view is expressed in
Freeman, Judgments (4th ed.) § 48.
"Pennington v. Gibson (1853) 57 U. S. 65.
'Story, Equity Pleading (ioth ed. by Gould) § 778, note 5; Thrall v.
Waller (1841)

13 Vt. 231.
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books upon equity," it seems worth while to re-examine the
matter in the light of the modem cases, with special reference
to the American authorities. In doing so we shall have to consider the legal effects of equitable decrees in (i) courts of equity,
and (2) courts of law. Incidentally and for the purpose of comparison we shall find it worth while to notice briefly the legal
effects in equity of common law judgments.
Let us begin by considering the concrete cases put by the
writer first quoted. Take the case where after a hearing on
the merits a decree is made against the validity of a claim. 7 The
statement is that the "decree against a claim on its merits will
always be a defence to any future suit in chancery upon the
same claim, not as destroying the claim or as proving conclusively
its invalidity, but as 'furnishing a sufficient reason why chancery
should not again take cognizance of it." It is also stated by the
learned writer that if the plaintiff obtain a decree in his favor,
the claim is not merged in the decree in the same way that a
claim at law is merged in a judgment. Now it is certainly true
to-day in every court of equity that so long as the decree stands
unreversed, the same matter can not be litigated again in equity,
and as chancery is a court of record, it seems difficult to believe
that there can be any difference in the theory applied by the
courts of law and equity respectively. In any event, we are not
left to speculate about the matter, for our American courts of
equity are entirely clear that there is no difference. Hear what
a modem court of equity, in a jurisdiction in which a separate
court of equity is still maintained, has to say upon the matter:
"It is settled that a verdict and judgment of a court of record
or a decree in chancery, puts an end to all further controversy
concerning the points thus decided between the parties to the
suit. . . . If the decree (in favor of the plaintiff) is final,
its result is to merge the original cause of action".8
"Keener, Cases on Equity jurisdiction, 8-9, note.
7
"The order for dismissing a bill at the hearing is not usually termed,
in the books, 'a decree', but merely an 'order of dismission'; but, to prevent
confusion, it is thought best to designate it as 'a decree', to distinguish
it from 'an order to dismiss', made upon motion." 2 Daniell, Chancery
Pleading & Practice (6th Amer. ed.) *933, note 9.
'Reed, J., in Mutual Insurance Co. v. Newton (1888) 5o N. J. L. 571,
577. Of course if a bill is dismissed for the reason that plaintiff is not
entitled to equitable relief, while the decree would be a bar to another
equitable suit, it would usually be left open for plaintiff to sue at law, the
dismissal being "without prejudice". In some cases a bill may be dismissed
without prejudice to the filing of a new bill. 2 Daniell, Chancery Pleading
& Practice (6th Amer. ed.) *993-994.
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The doctrine of res judicata is of course much wider than
anything we have thus far discussed. For our purposes the
following statements by the Supreme Court of the United States
are sufficiently accurate:
"The general principle announced in numerous cases is that
a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the
same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for
a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be
taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the
first suit remains unmodified."
It will be seen that this language does not require the adjudication to be by a court of law. All that is required is that
it be a "court of competent jurisdiction". Equity is such a court,
and accordingly our modem American cases hold that the doctrine
in its full extent does apply to the adjudications of equity.' 0
It will also be noticed that these quotations from modem
decisions do not say merely that the matter can not be litigated
again in equity. They simply say that it can not be litigated
again, meaning, apparently, in any court. May we therefore conclude that where a question has been litigated and settled by a
court of equity, the matter is res judicata not only in equity but
at law? And may we reverse the statement and say that if
the matter is settled by a law court, the same matter is res judicata
in equity ?11 If the writer first quoted on this question be correct,
these questions are to be answered in the negative. If the language
of other writers and of modem courts is to be taken at its
face value, the answer will be an affirmative one. The matter
'Southern Pacific Ry. v. United States (1897) 168 U. S. I, 48.
1
The current of authorities is so uniform that to cite cases is almost
superfluous. Many citations are given in 2 Black, Judgments (2nd ed.)
§ 517. Good examples are: Chiles v. Champenois (1891) 69 Miss. 6o3;
Preston v. Rickets (1886) 91 Mo. 320; Chouteau v. Gibson (1882) 76 Mo.
38. The latter case is of especial interest. The first equitable adjudication was an equitable counterclaim to a legal action. The decision was
adverse to the counterclaim. Later the former defendant as plaintiff
brought an equitable action on the same claim. A plea of res judicata
was allowed. Had the defense in the original action been a legal defense.
no such effect would have followed, since Missouri still follows the
common law rule that one ejectment does not bar another. See, however,
Idalia Co. v. Norman (Mo. 1914) 168 S. W. 749.
1
Of course, care must be taken to see that an attempt is being made to
litigate the same matter again. Very often it is a different matter that
the court of equity is asked to pass upon, and of course plaintiff is
entitled to a hearing.
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must of course be settled by the decisions in the cases. Let us
examine them from this point of view. In Young v. Farwell2
an action at law was brought to recover the reasonable value of
services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendants
answered that the services were rendered under an express contract which had been complied with; also that plaintiff had brought
an action against the defendants in the chancery court of Illinois
in which a final decree was rendered in favor of the defendants
and that the same was a final and conclusive adjudication upon
the merits as to the cause of action alleged in the present action.
The record of the adjudication of the Illinois court of equity
was introduced in evidence, and the New York court found that
"as the issue was framed in the Illinois suit, the precise question
was presented for determination, and was determined, as was
presented in this suit". This being so, the New York court held
that the previous adjudication in equity was a bar to litigating
the same question at law. The court said:
"It makes no difference that the judgment, or decree, set up
by way of estoppel, was one rendered in an equitable action for
an accounting; provided that the question involved in this commonlaw action was involved and determined in the equity action. That
a decree rendered in a cause, depending between parties in equity,
may be a bar to an action at law between them cannot be questioned. It turns upon the scope of the decree. If the same general
question furnished the subject-matter of the controversy-if the
material issue was the same in each action-the prior decree must
be regarded as conclusive, under the authorities. If the court,
which rendered the prior judgment between the parties, had jurisdiction of them and of the subject-matter of their controversy,
the principle of its finality is unaffected by the nature of the proceedings which led to the rendition of the judgment. The law
of estoppel is equally applicable. A prior judgment, whether
rendered in an action at law, or in equity, concludes the parties
upon the material issues and is conclusive as to all facts comprehended within the issues submitted, which were relevant and
material and which were so related to the issues that their determination was necessarily involved."
Another case from the same jurisdiction presented the following state of facts: In the previous equitable action a municipal
corporation, the present defendant in the court of law, had sought
to obtain the cancellation of certain bonds as invalid. The only
issue presented and tried was that of the vaiidity of the bonds
'(i9oi)

165 N. Y. 341.

HeinOnline -- 15 Colum. L. Rev. 232 1915

POWERS OF COURTS OF EQUITY.
and the court of equity adjudged the bonds valid. One of the
holders now sued the municipal corporation on some of the
bonds, and the defense was the alleged invalidity. The court of
law held that this matter was res judicata and could not be
litigated again. The court said: "It is of no consequence that
the judgment was in equity. . . . The town has had its day
in court, a full opportunity to assail and test the bonds, a patient
hearing and direct decision upon all the questions now raised. It
would be hard to find a case to which the doctrine of res adjudicata
could more justly and clearly apply than this."' 3
So clear and unanimous are the modem cases upon this point
that it is not worth while to give other examples at length. A
few are cited in the footnote.' 4 A brief search of the digest will
reveal many more. In view of these authorities, what shall we
say of the dictum of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Hart v. Sansom'5 that "upon a bill for the removal of a cloud
upon title, . . . the decree, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, is clearly not a judgment in rem, establishing
a title in land, but operates in personam only by restraining the
defendant from asserting his claim, and directing him to deliver
up his deed to be cancelled, or to execute a release to the plaintiff." The learned judge who wrote this opinion refers for
authority to the book in which is found the quotation given above,
denying legal effects to equitable decrees, citing the very section
containing the words above quoted. If this statement of the
learned judge in Hart v. Sanmom means anything, it means that
the determination of the legal title would 'not be res judicata
at law because of the adjudication in equity. Fortunately this
was merely a dictum and not a part of the decision, and it is
shown to be erroneous by numerous decisions to the contrary. 16
Is it not time for judges and writers to stop talking language
suitable to the time of Coke in discussing the power of equity,
'United States Bank v. Town of Solon (1893) 136 N. Y. 465, 480.
Coit v. Tracy (183o) 8 Conn. 268; People v. Rickert (1896) 159 Ill.
496; Foster v. Busteed (1868) Ioo Mass. 409, (semble) ; Powers v. Chelsea
Savings Bank (i88o) 129 Mass. 44; Winans v. Dunham (N. Y. 183o) 5
Wend. 47; Bradley v. German-American Insurance Co. (i8g8) 147 Mo.
63g; Hopkins v. Lee (i82r) i U. S. lO9, (semble). See also Freeman,
Judgments (4 th ed.) § 428, and cases cited.
14

'(I884)
6

rio U. S.151.

"For examples, see: Peoples' Bank v. Eberts (X893) 96 Mich. 396;
State v. Boller (C,C. 1889) 47 Fed. 415; Van Fleet, Former Adjudication,
§ 314 ef seq.
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and to recognize that a court of equity is a legal tribunal with
power to adjudicate and settle controversies as finally as a court
of law?
It should, of course, be equally true that when a matter has
been adjudicated by a court of law, it is res judicata in equity.
The authorities on this are equally uniform and emphatic, as
was to be expected, since the rule merely requires that the
matter be settled by a court of competent jurisdiction.' 7
It follows from this broad doctrine followed by modern courts
that if a debt be sued for in chancery, as it frequently may be,
not only is the original cause of action merged in the decree,
so that it can not be sued on again in equity, but it is also so
merged in the decree that it can not be sued on again at law.
For example, in Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Newton, 8 an action
was brought for the balance due on a bond after foreclosure proceedings had been had on the mortgage given to secure the bond.
The defendant pleaded that the sum sued for was the amount of
a deficiency declared and decreed by the Court of Chancery as
still due and owing upon the bond after the foreclosure; and
that a deficiency decree of the Court of Chancery for its payment
was duly rendered. This was held a good plea, on the ground
that "when the plaintiff invoked the Court of Chancery to give
him the statutory decree for deficiency, and he obtained it, his
right to bring a new suit on the bond was gone." Of course
decisions of this kind must be put into their proper setting; that
is, we must remember that in New Jersey, as in most of the
other States, the plaintiff was entitled to execution on his decree
as though it were a judgment. 19
So much for the question of the legal effects of equitable decrees in making a question res judicata, at law and in equity.
It may, however, be argued that there is a difference between
judgment at law and decree in equity for money, in that the
former creates a new right-the debt of record-while the decree
does nothing more than entitle the holder of it to the appropriate
procedure for its enforcement which we have described at length
in Part II. Indeed, the learned writer quoted above expressly
"The cases are cited in 2 Black, judgments, (2nd ed.) § 518, note 73;
also in Freeman, judgments (4th ed.) § 248, note 5.
13(1888) 5o N. J. L. 571.

'We must be very careful, in applying this doctrine, to be sure that

there was really only one cause of action which could be enforced in
either tribunal, as in the case put.
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asserts that this difference exists. He says that the common law
judgment, among other effects, "creates a new debt of a higher
nature", but that "if the same debt be sued for in the court of
chancery, (as it frequently may be), and a decree obtained for
its payment, not one of the effects before stated is produced
by the decree". If the decree has any effect of a kind comparable
to that of the common law judgment in creating a debt of a
higher nature, there are of course two possibilities: (i) that it
creates a common law debt, i. e., such a legal effect is attached
to it by the common law; (2) that the decree creates an "equitable
debt" of a higher nature. Before examining the cases, let us
note that a judgment of one jurisdiction is by the common law
of other jurisdictions recognized as creating a debt in these other
jurisdictions; or, more accurately, the common law of one jurisdiction gives to the judgment of the court of the other jurisdiction the legal effect stated. 20 The question at once arises: Does
either equity or the common law give to decrees for money rendered by foreign courts of equity a similar effect? With reference
to an equitable decree for money, therefore, we have the following questions to answer: (i) Does an equitable decree for money
create in the same jurisdiction a new obligation of some kind,
and if so, is it an "equitable debt of record", i. e. an equitable
obligation based upon the record of a court of equity; or is it
a common law debt? (2) Can a decree for money be sued on
in another jurisdiction, either as an equitable or a legal cause
of action? While these questions are distinct, and one might be
answered in the negative without affecting the answer to the
other, it is convenient in dealing with the cases to consider them
in connection with each other.
There seem to be no cases in which an attempt was made to
assert that a domestic decree in equity for the payment of money
gives rise in equity to a new cause of action based upon the
decree, at least where there are no difficulties in the way of
enforcing the original decree. Apparently there was no reason
for doing this, as no advantage could thus be gained. At common
law, execution had to be issued within a year and a day or the
right to it was lost. Originally in the personal actions the judgment could not be brought to life again by scire facias, which,
'Whether such an effect is given to foreign judgments is purely a
question of positive law. In the Civil Law, no such effect is attached to
foreign judgments. 3 Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, 537.
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until the Statute of Westminster II, apparently applied only to
the "real actions". The only remedy in the personal actions was
to bring a new action of debt on the record and obtain a new
judgment. In chancery, however, it seems there was no such time
limitation for the enforcement of decrees, and ordinarily, therefore, no new equitable action was necessary. Sometimes, however,
it did become necessary, or at least convenient, because of things
which had happened since the decree was made, to permit an
equitable action to enforce a decree, and when this was so, a
bill would lie for the enforcement of the decree. 21 The foundation of such a bill is the decree and not the original equitable
cause of action, and it should follow that on such a bill the merits
of the original controversy could not be gone into. In spite of
some confusion in the cases (based chiefly upon dicta, and perhaps one or two decisions of individual chancellors) this seems
to have been the prevailing view.22 The question at once arises:
If the original decree is obtained by fraud, can it, unless it be
attacked by a bill to set it aside, be enforced by a bill to obtain
a new decree; or can the defendant set up the fraud as a defence
in his answer to the bill? If as suggested here there is a real
analogy between judgment and decree, one would expect that,
just as fraud in obtaining a domestic judgment is no defence to
its enforcement, but the attack must be by a bill in equity filed
for that purpose, so here fraud will be, not a defence, but the
basis of a bill or cross-bill. While the authorities dealing with
this question are not numerous, (doubtless because bills to enforce
decrees are themselves uncommon), they are substantially
unanimous in holding that the fraud in obtaining the decree can
not be used as a defense to a bill to carry the decree into execution. They accordingly hold that if the decree is to be attacked
for the fraud in obtaining it, it must be by bill filed for that purpose. An example of this is found in Caldwell v. Giles,23 in which
an administrator had filed a bill to obtain satisfaction of a decree
for the payment of a sum of money, formerly obtained in the
same court by the intestate against the defendant. Defendant
in his answer set up that the original decree was obtained by the
'Mitford, Pleadings in Chancery (5th ed.) 95; Adams, Equity (4th
Amer. ed.) 826.
Minshull v. Lord Mohun (1711) 2 Vern. Ch. 672; s. c., on appeal, 6
Bro. P. C. 32- The cases are collected in Mitford, loc. cit.
'(S. C. 1837) 2 Hill, Eq., 548. On the general subject see Mitford,
loc cit.; Adams, Equity (4th Amer. ed.) 833; Carneal v. Wilsori (1823)
13 Ky. *8o; Edmondson v. Moseby (1830) 27 Ky. *497, 501.
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intestate by fraud, by inducing witnesses to testify falsely. The
chancellor held as follows: "There is no question, but that if
a decree be obtained by fraud, it may be set aside on an original
bill for that purpose. The only question is, whether the defendant can avail himself of this by his answer, so as to resist the
performance of the decree. I am of opinion that he cannot."
Accordingly, a decree for plaintiff was entered. On appeal, the
higher court affirmed the chancellor's decision, saying that the
matter raised by the defendant could be gone into "only on a
bill to set aside the decree for the fraud complained of, and
that course of proceeding is the only one recognized by the precedents". There are some dicta and perhaps decisions to the
contrary, but it is suggested by Mitford that these are cases
where the decree was not signed and enrolled.2 4 Some of the
cases can not be accounted for on that basis, but they are cases
in which the new decree was sought by others than the original
plaintiff, e. g., creditors, assignees, etc., and the court stated that
while ordinarily the rule was that the justice of the original
decree could not be gone into on a bill to execute it, in these
cases it could.25 A failure to keep this difference in mind has
led to much of the confusion, and doubtless to some real conflict of authority. In any event, "where a decree is capable of
being executed by the ordinary process and forms of the Court,
whatever the iniquity of the decree may be, yet, till it is reversed,
the Court is bound to assist it with the utmost process the course
of the Court will bear".26 In other words: until set aside when
directly attacked in the proper way, the decree, even though
fraudulently obtained, gives the plaintiff the right to demand
of the court and its officers all the usual remedies for its enforcement, including a new decree in a proper case.
Returning now to the decree for the payment of money: although it did not ordinarily give rise to a new cause of action
in equity for the reasons stated above, the question remains, did
it not form the basis of a common law action of debt? This
question was raised in Carpenter v. Thornton,27 in which an
'Mitford, loc. cit., note a.
'As in West v. Skip (1749) I Ves. 239.
26I Daniell, Chancery Practice (Ist
ed.) 194.
"(i8ig) 3 B. & Ald. 52. A brief but valuable discussion of the principles upon which legal actions upon equitable decrees for money may
be based is given by Professor Hohfeld in ii Michigan Law Rev. 568.
See also: Black, Judgments (2nd ed.) § 869; Freeman, Judgments (4th
ed.) § 434.
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action of assumpsit was brought on a domestic decree for the
payment of a sum of money, which had not been complied with.
The original cause of action was purely equitable. It was held
that no action would lie, but the judges differed in the reasons
given for the decision. Abbott, C. J., thought that if the decree
had been based upon a cause of action which might have been
sued on at law, as would often be the case, "a court of law
might, perhaps, lend its aid to enforce such a decree". As it
was, he concluded there was no "implied contract". His opinion
is not helpful, for it fails to distinguish between an assumpsit
on an actual contract implied in fact and a "contract implied in
law" or quasi-contract. The other judges gave various reasons,
nearly all really begging the question by assuming that the decree
did not give rise to a common law debt. If it did not, then of
course there was no "promise implied in law" to pay it. All
emphasized the form of the decree as a mere "order to pay the
money" and Holroyd, J., added: "The mode of enforcing such
an order is by attachment, for contempt in not obeying the
order of the court." How incomplete this statement is we have
already seen in Part f. The inadequacy of the reasons given
to account for the decision appears clearly in the subsequent case
of Henley v. Soper,28 in which an action of debt was brought on
the decree of a colonial court of equity. This decree was for
the payment of a sum of money found by the court of equity to
be due from one partner to another after the court had had
the proper account taken. The court held, unanimously that
debt would lie on such a decree. Apparently some of the judges
seemed to think, and other courts later have had the same idea,
that the colonial court of equity was enforcing by its decree a
legal and not an equitable duty to account. Inasmuch as no action
of debt would lie by one partner against the other unless an
account had been stated between the parties; and as there was
29
no common law action to compel an accounting in such a case,
but the only remedy was by a bill in equity, it would seem that
the decree was based upon an equitable and not upon a legal duty
'(I828)

8 B. & C. i6.

'It seems that the common law action of account did not cover

partners. To-day some courts doubtless permit an action at law where
the account is a very simple one. The same thing has been allowed where

the relation was purely equitable; as in the case of trustees where the sole
remaining duty was to pay over a sum of money.
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to account. 30 The real effect of the decision therefore is to
permit an action of debt at law on the decree of the foreign court
of equity, that decree being based upon an equitable and not
upon a legal cause of action. It is worthy of notice that much
is said in the opinions which is not in harmony with the opinions
in Carpenter v. Thornton. Lord Tenterden, C. J., for example,
says: "There is a great difference between the decree of a colonial
court of equity and of a court of equity of this country. The
colonial court of equity can not enforce its decrees here, a court
of equity in this country may; and, therefore, in the latter case
there is no occasion for the interference of a court of law, in
the former there is, to prevent a failure of justice." This makes
the decision in the first case depend not upon the fundamental
characteristics of a decree as a merely personal order to pay, but
upon the lack of necessity for a legal action. As a matter of fact,
though the necessity for resorting to an English court appears in
the case of a foreign decree, it by no means follows that it
should be an English court of law. Why not ask the English
court of equity to recognize the foreign decree as creating, according to English chancery law, a cause of action in equity, entitling
the plaintiff to a new decree in England? Apparently this idea
never presented itself to anyone concerned, yet this very thing
was tried and seemingly with success many years before in
Morgan's Case.31 That case, however, seems not to have been
known to the parties or the court in the principal case. We
must also note that the learned judge went on to distinguish the
principal case from Carpenter v. Thornton, on the ground that in
Carpenter v. Thornton the matter was one of purely equitable
jurisdiction, while here if an account were stated a court of
law would deal with the matter. As already stated, this seems
to involve some confusion of thought. The fact that a common
law duty would arise if an account were stated, does not show
that one exists before that time. Bayley, J., put the allowance
of the action in this case upon much the same ground. He argued
that since an action at law would lie on an account stated by the
parties, "it cannot make any difference that the balance in
the present case was settled by the Court instead of by the parties
'It may also be noted in passing that an action on account stated will

lie where the statement is made because of a purely equitable relationship, as in the case of a trustee and cestui que trust.
'(1737) I Atk. 408.
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themselves out of Court". This is a sensible conclusion, but it
must be noted that it is the decree of the colonial court that
gives rise to the debt, for until the court has ascertained finally
the balance due, there is no common law debt or duty to pay the
money. Apparently Bayley, J., if he followed his logic out to
its legitimate consequences, would permit an action of debt on
a domestic decree founded upon a relationship of this kind. Holroyd, J., concurred on the ground that an action of debt would
lie "upon the decree of a foreign court of equity if duly perfected". Appirently he would not limit the doctrine to the case
of decrees based upon common law relationships.
With the English authorities in this condition, it was to be
expected that there would be confusion and conflict in the American decisions. As a matter of fact, there is very little, at least
in the modern cases. In discussing them, we must keep in mind
the statutory innovations which were being introduced during
the last century, permitting execution as at common law on
equitable decrees, abolishing imprisonment for debt, etc., as described in Part II. It was to be expected that these changes
would influence considerably the views of the American courts
upon the question we are considering. Attention may again be
directed in passing to the fact that apparently, even at the date
of the case just referred to, the English Court of Chancery was
not yet looked at by the common law as a court of record, a
view not followed in America. This difference also must be
taken into account in considering the American cases. Curiously
enough the question of suing at law on a foreign decree was
raised in America some years before the decision in the English
cases just discussed. In 1805 the Supreme Court of New York
32
was asked to pass upon the question in the case of Post v. Neafie.
A decree for the payment of money by defendant to the plaintiff had been made by the Chancery Court of New Jersey. An
action of debt was brought in a New York court on this decree.
Under the New Jersey statute of 1799, referred to in Part II
of this article, common law execution could be issued to enforce
decrees in New Jersey, and this undoubtedly influenced the decision somewhat. Counsel for the plaintiff argued, among other
things, that the New Jersey Court of Chancery was a court of
record, even if the English chancery court was not, and that
therefore the action would lie. A majority of the court, (Kent,
I(N. Y. 18o5) 3 Caines,

22.
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C. J., and another judge dissenting), held the action would lie.
They admitted that there was no precedent for such an action.
A portion of the opinion of Livingston, J., is worth quoting:"Debt, it is said, will not lie on the decree of a court of
equity. In examining this point, I shall take it for granted, as
is truly the case, that this decree is for the payment of money
only. A mere equity, it is alleged, is no ground of relief at
common law, and that the objects of equitable and legal jurisdiction, being so very different, it is impossible the former can
be enforced by the tribunals of the latter. This may be correct
in the first instance; but after the original ground of complaint
has been litigated and determined in chancery, why should not
its decree or judgment, if for the payment of money, be the
ground of an action at law, as well as the judgment of any other
court? That we have no precedent of this kind is easily accounted for. Decrees in equity are more generally for the performance of certain acts, to which common law courts cannot
compel obedience, and therefore the successful party can, in
such cases, obtain execution, only out of the same court."
As stated, Kent, C. J., dissented, chiefly on the ground that no
precedent for the action could be found, arguing that "the reason
why courts of law would not take coguizance of decrees, is
to be deduced from the history and peculiar jurisdiction of the
court of chancery; and although the reason of the rule may not
now be applicable to some of its decrees, yet we are not at liberty
at this day to set aside the rule". He concluded by suggesting
that an action could be brought on the decree in the New York
court of chancery, citing Morgan's case, mentioned above.33
While the decision in Post v. Neafie undoubtedly had a large
influence upon later decisions, the development which it started
was inevitable if the same manner of execution was to be used
for common law judgment and decree in equity. Consequently,
ever since Post v. Neafie the line of authorities permitting an
action at law on a foreign decree for the payment of money,
where the decree is final and absolute, is practically unbroken.
In 1823 the question arose in Pennsylvania, and the only authority
in favor of the action that was cited was Post v. Neafie. The
Pennsylvania court followed the New York court, saying: "It
'Another reason given by Kent, C. J., was that as the New Jersey
decree was merely prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts, etc.,
the New York court of law might have to go into the equitable cause
of action itself. As the Supreme Court of the United States later decided, the New Jersey decree was conclusive, and so this objection was
not sound. See comment on Kent's opinion in Pennington v. Gibson

(1853)

57 U. S. 65, 69-70.
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is a general principle, that where a man is under an obligation to
pay a certain sum of minoney, whether that obligation is founded
on a contract, or the judgment of a court, an action of debt lies.
On that principle, we support actions of debt on foreign judgments. And I confess, I see no reason why a decree in chancery,
is not as strong as a foreign judgment."3 4 A few of the many
authorities are cited in the footnote. 5 In some, emphasis is placed
upon the fact that, by the statutes of the State in which the
decree was rendered, the decree is given the effect of a judgment
at law. As this legislation is found almost everywhere, this
limitation amounts to very little, even if it be accepted. No modern
decision refusing the action at law on a foreign decree because of
the absence of such legislation has come to the notice of the
present writer, and many of the decisions make no mention of
such a limitation. It may perhaps safely be concluded that such
a limitation does not exist, at least in most jurisdictions. In
the case of decrees for alimony, the action is sometimes denied
because the particular decree is not final and absolute. 0
The case of an action at law based on the decree of the court
of chancery of the same jurisdiction has given the American
courts little difficulty. Such actions are of course very rare,
for as common law execution may now be had on decrees in
most jurisdictions, little is to be gained by the action at law. In
Thrall v. Waller 3 7 an action of debt was brougit on such a decree,
and was allowed. Redfield, J., pointed out that the decree was
based upon a partnership accounting, the very case in which, it
was suggested by the dicta in Carpenter v. Thornton, a court of
law might allow the action. No authority allowing the action
was cited, however, and only the cases discussed above were
mentioned. As a matter of fact many years before, in i818, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts had permitted an action of
debt on a decree for payment of alimony entered by a Massachusetts court. The court said: "The debt is certain, and it is
proved by record; and the decree is, in effect, as much a judg'Evans v. Tatem (Pa. 1823) 9 S. & R. 252.
'Tompkins v. Cooper (895) 97 Ga. 631; Warren v. McCarthy (i86o)
Ill.
83; Williams v. Preston (i83o) 26 Ky. 6oo; McKim v. Odom
(1835) 12 Me. 94; Davis v. Lipschitz (i9o2) 96 Mo. App. 587; Kunze v.
Kunze (i896) 94 Wis. 54; De Longe v. Vishback (i9i3) 153 Wis. i93;
Pennington v. Gibson (1853) 57 U. S. 65.
'See cases in 54 L. R. A. 2o4; 65 L. R. A. 816, and references there
given.
25

"7(1841)

13 Vt. 231.
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ment as if rendered on the common law side of the Court."-8 The
case of Hugh v. Higgs" is often cited as a holding to the contrary, but it seems that it is not, as it held that an action at
law would not lie upon the "decretal order" of the chancery court,
which of course is entirely sound, as a "decretal order" settles
nothing finally. There is, however, a dictum in the case denying that an action at law would lie on a decree, but apparently
the matter had not been carefully considered. As stated, cases
actually involving the question rarely arise, but when they do
the decision is nearly always in favor of the action. There are
also almost innumerable dicta in favor of allowing the action,
the most notable and emphatic being that in Pennington v. Gibson :40 "We lay it down, therefore, as the general rule, that in
every instance in which an action of debt can be maintained upon
a judgment at law for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity
which is for an ascertained and specific amount, and nothing more;
and that the record of the proceedings in the one case must be
ranked with and responded to as of the same dignity and binding
obligation with the record in the other."'"
If the decree be not for the payment of money, but for the
doing of some other act, such as to convey land, we have seen
above that as a rule no new action in equity may be brought upon
it in the same jurisdiction, apparently for the reason that there is
no necessity for permitting it. Wherever there is need, a "bill to
execute the decree" is allowed, as we have seen. There remains
the question: Can an action, either at law or in equity, be brought
upon a foreign decree which is for the doing of anything except
the payment of money? Although there is no reason why such
actions should not be allowed, if any necessity for them exists,
it seems to be supposed by some writers that our system makes no
provision for them. One writer says:
"An equitable decree for the doing of an act, except the mere
payment of money, is not by our law enforceable in another court,
even of the same State; there is no form of proceeding for enforcing the merely personal decree of a court of equity, except by order
'Howard v. Howard (1818) 15 Mass. 196.
'(1823) 21 U. S. 697.
4(0853) 57 U. S. 65.
'Ames v. Hoy (1859) 12 Cal. ir; Blattner v. Frost (1892) 44 Ill. App.
58o; McKim v. Odom (1835) 12 Me. 94, (semble). The case of Richardson v. Jones (Md. 1831) 3 Gill & J. x63, often cited as contra, contains
only the merest obiter dictum on the question.
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of the court rendering it. It is therefore impossible to enforce a
foreign decree that an act be done by the defendant, such as making
a conveyance, either by decreeing the conveyance without judicial
investigation or by regarding it as made. An additional objection
to enforcing such a decree is that it is not in its nature the establishment of an obligation, but rather
a method of enforcing an
' 42
obligation, a form of execution.

Other writers, however, express a contrary view.43 As a matter
of fact, the truth seems to lie somewhere between the two statements, i. e., such equitable actions in other jurisdictions may be
brought on some though not on all decrees. Looking at the matter
aside from authority, is there anything inherent in the nature of
a decree of a court of equity for the doing of an act-say the
execution of a deed conveying land-which prevents a court of
equity in another jurisdiction from holding it to be the equity law
of that jurisdiction that the decree of the foreign chancellor gives
rise to an equitable cause of action on which a bill for specific
performance may be filed? It seems not. An order to pay money
and an order to convey land are both in the same form, and one
seems to be no more a "merely personal decree" than the other.
It is therefore purely a question of positive law whether our system of law has given such legal consequences in equity to foreign
decrees for the doing of acts. It seems that in some cases it has
and in others it has not. In the case of a decree ordering the conveyance of land, if the decree be entered by the court of equity of
the jurisdiction within whose limits the land is situated, there is
usually no need to-day for any such relief, as the court may itself
vest the title in the plaintiff, if defendant does not comply with
the decree. Consequently we must not expect to find many cases
in the books. Wherever such relief is necessary, however, it
seems to be the law, as far as authorities can be found, that if
the decree for the conveyance of land is based upon a contract,
express trust, or other consensual relationship of the parties which
gives rise, independently of the decree, to equitable interests for
the enforcement of which the decree is entered, a bill in equity
will lie in other jurisdictions upon the decree itself, if it has not
been obeyed, as a substantive cause of action. "For example, in
Roblin v. Long,44 defendant had been ordered by the Chancery
'3 Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, 537.
'2 Black, Judgments (2nd ed.) § 872; Hohfeld, ii Michigan Law Rev.
551. See also the remarks of Holmes, J., in Fall v. Eastin (09og) 215
U. S. I, 14.
"(N. Y. i88o) 6o How. Pr. 2o0.
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Court of the Province of Ontario, Canada, to convey to the plaintiff land situated in Ontario. He did not obey and went to New
York. An equitable action was brought in New York, the decree
and not the original contract being sued on as the cause of action,
and a new decree for conveyance was sought. The relief asked
for was given, the court assuming that of course the plaintiff was
entitled to a new decree. The same result was reached in the
Michigan case of Dunlap v. Byers,45 dlthough the decree of the
Ohio court was for the conveyance of land in Michigan. The instances of such relief are not numerous, probably for the reason
suggested above. The principle has, however, often received extrajudicial approval.48 The case of Burnley v. Stevenson, cited in the
last note, goes indeed much farther than the other cases, by holding
that when the defendant, who has disobeyed the foreign chancellor's decree ordering a conveyance of land, brings an ejectment,
in the State where the land is, against the previous plaintiff in
equity (now defendant at law) the latter may plead the foreign
decree as an "equitable defence" under the code of civil procedure.
The result of this holding seems to be that the legal effect of the
foreign decree and of possession together is to pass legal title, i. e.,
defendant is in possession and no one has the right or power to
disturb him. This is doubtless an extreme view and it would seem
better to compel the defendant to plead the foreign decree as an
equitable counterclaim, asking for specific performance by way of
a new decree.
The case cited to support the proposition that decrees in equity
for the conveyance of land are not recognized as having in other
jurisdictions the effects stated, is Bullock v. Bullock.47 In that
'(x896)

xxo Mich. xog.

"Fletcher v. Ferrel (,840) 39 Ky. *372, (personal property; relief
denied for other reasons); Burnley v. Stevenson (1873) 2 Ohio St. 474;
Vaught v. Meador (igoi) 99 Va. 569.
'(1894) 52 N. J. Eq. 561. The New Jersey court in its opinion gives
an argument much like that quoted in the text from Prof. Beale's Summary. If we adopt that view, the result is that in New Jersey, after a
decree in New York for specific performance of a contract to convey
New Jersey land, a bill must be filed for specific performance of the
original contract. At the trial, however, it seems that the determination
of the New York Court that the contract was made, etc., could be introduced as "conclusive evidence" of the contract, so that there would be
no new investigation into that. The difference between Prof. Beale's
view and that urged here would thus be merely a technical one. A
question not discussed here is the effect of the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution in requiring States to permit suits on equitable decrees. To discuss that is beyond the scope of this article. The contention is merely that States have permitted such actions on foreign
decrees, and that to do so is sound.
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case a New York court of equity, after entering a decree of
divorce and decreeing alimony, ordered the defendant to execute,
by way of security for the payment of the alimony, a mortgage on
New Jersey land. He did not do so and this action was brought
in the New Jersey chancery court for specific performance of the
New York decree. Relief was denied. The chief objection of
the court seemed to be based upon the fact that the New York
court was attempting by its decree to create and not merely to
enforce an equitable interest in New Jersey land, there being in
existence prior to the decree no such equitable interest. The
reasons for and against the view that a New York court has no
jurisdiction, i. e., power, to do a thing of this kind have already
been set forth in Part

11.48

and need not be repeated here.

Prob-

ably the view taken by the New Jersey court would be followed by
most if not all courts. Even so, the decision has as a decision no
beaning upon a case in which all courts recognize that the court
of the other State has jurisdiction to make a decree which will be
tecognized everywhere as binding, viz., where specific enforcement
is asked of equitable interests created by the agreements of the
4
parties themselves . 8
We are now perhaps ready to consider the truth of the statements which stand as quotations at the opening of this series of
articles: "A decree does not bind the right, but only the person
to obedience"; "A decree there binds the person to obedience, but
does not at all operate upon the matter in question". These statements were made centuries ago. Are they still a part of the law
which determines the relations of courts of law and equity to each
other? Has there been no evolution? Let us consider cases like
that in connection with which these statements were made. A bond
is obtained by fraud, 9 or there was to be a consideration which
has failed. At common law there was no defense to such an
instrument. The chancellor however would enjoin suit upon the
instrument and order it delivered up to be cancelled. This was
Columbia Law Rev. 128-129.
seems to be recognized that a court of equity may enforce a
constructive trust growing out of acts of the parties themselves, even
though the land is not in the jurisdiction. Butterfield v. Butterfield
(i9o5) 9 Ariz. 2t2. If so, the decree in such a case ought to furnish the
basis of a cause of action in another jurisdiction, as in the case of express
trusts. No case raising this question has come to the writer's attention.
'It is assumed that the one executing the bond knew the character of
the instrument he was executing. If he was deceived as to that, it is not
his bond, and that may be shown at law under the proper plea.
4815

411It
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done in the case in question.50 Defendant refused to surrender
the bond and went to jail for contempt. In the Common Bench,
the defendant in equity, as plaintiff, sued on the bond. It was
held that the chancery decree was no defense to the action at law.
This was in 1459. Is this still the law? Many writers would have
us believe that it is. Let us put the case concretely as it might
come up to-day. In the federal courts, it is still the law that fraud
does not invalidate a sealed obligation in a court of law. 51 Mr.
Justice X, sitting as a chancery judge, finds that a bond, or a
release of a legal cause of action, was obtained by fraud. He
orders the instrument delivered up to be cancelled. Defendant
refuses to do so and goes to jail. Defendant instructs his attorney to proceed with the suit on the bond. Would Mr. Justice X,
sitting as a common law judge, hold that the bond was still a valid
subsisting common law cause of action, so that further equitable
relief would be necessary to prevent a recovery; or would he permit the chancery decree to be set up as a defense to the common
law action? If it were the case of a release obtained by fraud,
would he hold it still a valid release and so a defense to the common law action, or would he hold that the legal effect of his decree
as chancellor was to destroy the legal validity of the release and
thus to reinstate the common law cause of action ?52
It is perhaps worthy of note that in Professor Ames's collection
of cases on equity, no modem cases following the case of J. R. v.
M. P. are cited. Let us see what we can find. In Dobson v.
53 a money judgment
Pearce
at law was obtained in New York.
An action of debt was later brought on the New York judgment
in a Connecticut court. Thereupon the defendant began a chancery
action in Connecticut, alleging fraud in the procuring of -the New
York judgment. This action in equity resulted in a decree of the
Connecticut court of equity declaring that the judgment was
J. R. v. M. P. (1459) Y. B. 37 Hen. VI. fol. 13, pl. 3; s. c. Jenk,
Cent. Cas. io8, pl. 9.
5
Vandervelden v. Railway Co. (C. C. 1894) 6i Fed. 54; Heck v.
Missouri Pacific Ry. (C. C. i9o6) 147 Fed. 77; Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Webb (C. C. A. i9o7) 157 Fed. 155. The authorities are collected in
the opinion in the last case.
"Under the new part of Rule 8 of the New Federal Equity Rules,
presumably in proper cases the judge would not hesitate to appoint someone to execute a release of the bond in the name of the defendant.
Doubtless such a formality would satisfy everyone. The power to do
this is not given by statute, however, but only by rule of court; and
the rule suggested in the next paragraph of the text is merely a simpler
way to do the same thing.

'"(1854)

12

N. Y. 156.
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fraudulently obtained, and perpetually enjoining the prosecution
of the action at law. Later this action was brought in New York
on the original New York judgment, on the theory that the Connecticut decree in equity did not "operate on the matter in question", i. e., did not affect the validity of the judgment. The New
York court held, however, that the Connecticut decree could be
set up as a defence to the action at law. 54 If this decision be
correct, the result would have been the same if the decree had
been made by a New York court of equity.- This decision of
course was based upon, or at least influenced by, the provisions of
the New York Code of Civil Procedure. The effect of it is to
give to the adjudication of the court of equity the legal effect
of destroying the common law debt based on the judgment. This
would not have been true had defendant been required to set the
decree up as an equitable counterclaim. Presumably the court
which decided Dobson v. Pearce would hold that execution could
not be had on the original judgment, i. e., that the legal effect of
the decree was to discharge the judgment or at least the right to
execution. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent. The same
court would be bound to hold, if fraud were not a defense to an
action at law on a specialty, that a decree in equity ordering
surrender of the bond for cancellation and perpetually enjoining
suit upon it, constituted a valid defence at law to a suit based upon
it. While, as stated, the result in Dobson v. Pearce was influenced
by the Code of Civil Procedure, is it not a result that should be
reached to-day by all courts? It is a change in substantive law,
and in fact the Code contained no authority for it. It has the
merit of preserving the advantages of the old system, viz., that
principles of equity as to fraud, failure of consideration, etc., are
to be administered by the chancellor, which to-day means in most
States merely judge without jury, as distinguished from judge
with jury. On the other hand, under a modem system of procedure which allows the equitable action for cancellation to be
brought by way of counterclaim to the law action, it obtains all
the real advantages, without the disadvantages, of supposed simplifications which make the fraud, etc., legal defenses, and thus
'he opinion of the court is not as clear as it might be upon the

point whether the decree has the effect stated, or the fraud has that effect

and the decree conclusively establishes the fact of fraud. However,
it is not believed that there is any well-considered authority holding that
the fraud itself can be set up as a mere defense to an action on a judgment, so that it seems clear the decision has the effect of establishing
the rule stated in the text.
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compel principles of equity to be administered by a common law
tribunal, i. e., by a judge and jury. Such a tribunal is often not
adapted to deal effectively either with equitable principles or the
kind of facts involved in these controversies; and its decisions are
subject to a different kind of appellate review. Would it really be
a startling thing if Mr. Justice X, sitting in the federal court of
common law, should, even without the aid of a code of civil procedure, rule in accordance with Dobson v. Pearce? There are
apparently no modern precedents to prevent his doing so. As
matters are, where in a suit at law in a federal court fraud was
set up as matter in confession and avoidance of a release under
seal, the court held that while the fraud did not at law in the
federal courts have that effect, "if the plaintiff [the one setting up
the fraud] so desires, the trial of the law action may be postponed, with leave to the plaintiff to file a bill in equity for the
purpose of attacking and testing the validity" of the release. 55
That is, sitting in a common law suit, the judge dispensed for the
time being with the necessity for a temporary injunction to stay
the proceeding at law.58 If in the equity proceeding he finds the
fraud as alleged and orders cancellation, but does not succeed in
getting hold of the physical instrument, shall he refuse in the
common law proceeding to give a common sense effect to his
5
adjudication in the' equity proceeding ?
The well-known case of Platt v. Woodruff5s may be supposed
to be in conflict with the principle here suggested. In that case
an action was brought at law on a negotiable instrument. Certain
defenses were set up. The defendant in the law suit then began
in another court an action in equity for cancellation of the instrument, asking a temporary injunction. The grounds for relief
were substantially the facts relied on in the law suit as a defence.
'Vandervelden v. Railway Co. (C. C. 1894) 6i Fed. 54.

'This, of course, is always the effect in a similar case of an equitable
counterclaim under code procedure. It acts automatically to stop the
action at law until the counterclaim has been disposed of.
'The case of Burnley v. Stevenson (873) 24 Oh. St. 474, discussed
above in the text, -is another code decision following the principle of
Dobson v. Pearce. The equitable decree for conveyance was there
allowed not as an equitable counterclaim but as a defense to an ejectment.
This gives to the decree the effect of depriving the plaintiff at law of his
right to recover possession; and so of his legal title. Other cases which
at least indicate the probability that Dobson v. Pearce would be followed
are: Chouteau v. Gibson (1882) -6 Mo. 38; Preston v. Rickets (i886)
91 Mo. 32o; Sampson v. Mitchell (0894) 125 Mo. 217.
1(1875) 6i N. Y. 378.

HeinOnline -- 15 Colum. L. Rev. 249 1915

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW.
A temporary injunction was granted and later vacated as irregularly granted. Later another temporary injunction was obtained
from another judge restraining the plaintiff at law from prosecuting his suit. The plaintiff at law disobeyed the injunction, and
after a trial obtained a judgment. Later the second temporary
injunction was vacated as irregularly granted. The action in
equity now came on for a hearing. A referee held the judgment
at law void. This was correctly held erroneous. When the judgment was entered, there was no final decree in the case, purporting
to be based upon a determination of the rights of the parties. The
temporary injunction could therefore be nothing more than an
order personally binding the party enjoined. It did not divest the
common law court of jurisdiction, i. e., power to act and enter a
judgment. Further, it was not called to the attention of the common law court in any way. The common law court, having jurisdiction, heard the case and entered judgment. On the principles
set forth above concerning the doctrine of res judicata, if the facts
alleged as a defence at law were the same facts that formed the
basis of the equitable action for cancellation, as might well be the
case, the adjudication at law settled the matter and the plaintiff
in the equitable action could not litigate it again.59 Let us note
also that it is not contended that the decree of the court of equity
in Dobson v. Pearce deprived the court of law of any jurisdiction,
i. e., power to act. If the principle contended for here should be
adopted, it would not follow that a judgment of a trial court
refusing to recognize the decree as having the legal effect suggested would be void. It would most certainly be valid and binding until reversed, though erroneous and liable to be reversed by
an appellate tribunal which accepted the principle of Dobson v.
Pearce. It would merely be the case of a court having jurisdiction
making an error as to the law to be applied to the state of facts
before it. From whatever point of view the matter be approached,
the decision in Platt v. Woodruff is sound and entirely consistent
with Dobson v. Pearce.
There is one other well established rule which may at first
sight seem inconsistent with the rule laid down in Dobson v.
Pearce. The reference is to cases like Winston v. Westfeldt,60
in which a court of equity ordered a negotiable instrument deliv'This is because often the same facts may constitute a defense at law
to a contract or note, and also constitute the basis of an equitable suit
for cancellation, at least if no lawsuit has been brought.
(I8s53) 22 Ala. 76o; i Ames, Cases in Equity Jurisdictibn, 3.
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ered up for cancellation. Instead of doing so, the defendant negotiated it to a holder in due course. It was held that the latter
could enforce it, the negotiation having been before maturity. It
may be argued that this result shows that the decree for cancellation has not the legal effects herein ascribed to it. This, however,
turns out upon analysis to be a superficial view. In order to
have the power to vest an indefeasible title in a holder in due
course, it is not necessary that the one negotiating the instrument
have any real title to it, i. e., any right to recover on it himself.
A thief who steals a negotiable instrument payable to bearer certainly has no right to recover on it himself, that is, the maker (if,
for example, it be a promissory note) is under no duty to pay
the thief, but in spite of this the latter is, on grounds of policy,
given the power to do acts which result in giving one who buys
in good faith and for value an indefeasible right. Recurring to
our analysis as presented in Part I, the thief has no true right
against the maker, (i. e., the maker owes him no duty to pay)
and no privilege (i. e., he is under a duty to the payee not) to
negotiate the note; but he does have a power to negotiate it to a
holder in due course. The same may be said of the note in the principal case after the decree in equity for cancellation is entered.
While in the hands of the defendant, it is not a valid note; the
defendant has not a true right against the maker; and that he has
not is conclusively settled by the decree in equity ;"" but he has, on
grounds of policy, a power to vest true rights, etc., in a holder in
due course. These cases are therefore not authorities for a view
contrary to that suggested. In fact, it is extremely difficult to find
any modern case in which the decision really involves a principle
inconsistent with that established for New York by Dobson v.
Pearce. In closing it may be pointed out that this common sense
rule is entirely analogous to the statutory power in rem conferred
upon courts of equity to vest title to land by their decrees. May
we not believe that in the case of judgments obtained by fraud,
and of specialties in jurisdictions where "equitable defences" are
not allowed, this development, giving to the decree of the chancellor an effect in rem upon the legal right involved, has already
taken place in the evolution of our legal system? Is it too much to
'In the case of the negotiable note, the fraud is a defense to an action
at law prior to the decree for cancellation; consequently the case differs
from that of the sealed instrument. Even so, it seems it is the decree
for cancellation which now constitutes a good plea in confession and
avoidance, whereas before the decree the fraud itself was the defense.
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expect that common sense rather than an outworn phrase shall
in the future govern the relations of the two co-ordinate parts of
1
our legal system ?62
WALTIER WHIEELER COOK.
UNIVERSITY OV CHICAGO.

'The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Prof. W. N.
Hohfeld of Yale University, with whom he has discussed, in conversations
scattered over a number of years, the leading points of this series of
articles. Many valuable suggestions were derived from these conversations, as well as from the articles referred to in the notes. Acknowledgment is also due to the writer's colleagues on the University of
Chicago faculty, for valuable criticism and suggestions. It is perhaps
needless to add that none of these are responsible for the detailed treatment here given.
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